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1. Introduction
Charles Darwin was, clearly, a man comfortable with epistemic
ambiguity. Indeed, one of the most refreshing things about reading
the works of Darwindparticularly his reﬂections in his many and
detailed notebooksdis how he is willing to frankly acknowledge
his ignorance. Nowhere, arguably, is this evidenced more than in
Darwin’s discussions of variation. While Darwin was deeply con-
cerned with explaining the way in which variations occurred in
animals, as has been expertly argued by both Hodge and Sloan
(Hodge, 1985; Sloan, 1986), his empirical success was limited, and
evolutionary theory would await the uniﬁcation of Mendelian ge-
netics with Darwin’s work in the early 20th century (and the
characterization of DNA beyond it) before the problem would fully
be resolved.
This left Darwin in something of an unenviable position. He
knew that explaining the causes of the variations that produced the
history of life would be vital to, in particular, his critics’ acceptance
of his theory, yet he had precious little that he could concretely say
about them. In no small part, then, the period dubbed the “eclipse
of Darwinism” by Bowler (1992) can be interpreted as being driven
by the inability of the Darwinian theory of the day to offer a
coherent account of variation.
Despite this minimal historical sketch being nearly common
knowledge at this point, it can still offer us a vast array of inter-
esting historical questions to be analyzed. One, in particular, will be
the focus here. How did Darwin deal, rhetorically, with the fact that
he could not offer an ironclad, empirically supported theory of
variation?
It is clear that the answer to this question has something to do
with Darwin’s use of chance. After all, we now refer to one of the
central principles underlying his insight about heritable variation
as “random variation,” and much of this usage traces directly back
to Darwin’s own frequent references to chance in the discussion of
variation. Famously, of course (and right at the beginning of a
chapter of the Origin of species, no less), Darwin explicitly asserted
that such references point out only our lack of understanding of the
relevant causes at work:
I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations e so
common and multiform in organic beings under domestication,
and in a lesser degree in those in a state of nature e had been
due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression,
but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause
of each particular variation. (Darwin, 1859, p. 131)
But the simplicity of this disavowal (and the implication,
thereby, that there exists only one notion of “chance” in Darwin-
dchance as ignorance of true causes) masks the depth and so-
phistication of Darwin’s thought on the matter. As has been argued
by numerous commentators (Beatty, 2006; Depew & Weber, 1995;
Hodge, 1987; Hull, 1973; Pence, 2015), chance is one of the most
subtle and interesting topics in Darwin’s thought, and studying it
can shed light on the way in which Darwin understood areas of
biology as disparate as the causal structure of natural selection and
the morphology of orchids.
One fact must be acknowledged immediatelydwhen Darwin
uses the word “chance,” he refers to a bewilderingly large variety of
concepts. For example, in my ownwork on Darwin’s use of chance, I
note that Darwin moves back and forth among chance as the
absence of design, chance as something like the law of large
numbers (about which more later), and (most often) chance as
subjective ignorance of the true deterministic laws, leading as a
consequence to unpredictability (Pence, 2015, pp. 50e51). Beatty
(2006, p. 630) emphasizes in addition to these the sense inE-mail address: charles@charlespence.net.
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which, by extension, divergences themselves can be said to be
“chancy” (i.e., unpredictable) for Darwin. Several other authors
(Lennox, 2010; Noguera-Solano, 2013) have also more fully eluci-
dated the role of chance as opposed to design (or, to borrow
Noguera-Solano’s apt term, “predesign”) in variation. All our ana-
lyses of Darwin’s use of chance, then, must ﬁgure out how to come
to terms with this thoroughgoing polysemy.
Into this tangled fold enters Curtis Johnson’s new book, Darwin’s
dice: The idea of chance in the thought of Charles Darwin. While I
think there is much to recommend the detailed analysis that is
found in Johnson’s book, I have genuine reservations about its
central theses. Happily, howeverdand for precisely the reasons
that I noted abovedexploring my misgivings illuminates many of
themost exciting and interesting areas of Darwin’s thought. In spite
of our disagreements, I believe that Johnson has carefully and
clearly pointed out awealth of information, much of it important to
clarifying our understanding of Darwin.
2. A wide-searching spotlight
I should begin by noting the impressive breadth of Johnson’s
work, which is undoubtedly its most outstanding feature. Johnson
works through Darwin’s discussion of chance as it applies to a large
array of topicsdthe chance transport of organisms to new loca-
tions, chance as related to the causes of variations, chance’s role in
the anthropomorphized, agential version of natural selection (and
the changes in this position over time), the focal “architect” met-
aphor found in the Descent of man, Darwin’s evolving relationship
to the “Lamarckian” inﬂuences of use and disuse, and ﬁnally his
thoughts on the relationship between chance and human free will
and morality. A synthetic account of all these strands had yet to be
attempted, making much in Johnson’s book rewarding even for
those who have already read fairly extensively in Darwin studies.
To single out a few of these themes, I ﬁnd particularly intriguing
Johnson’s treatment of “chance transport”dthe facilitation of the
distribution of species by carriage across water to islands. Johnson
emphasizes and details the role of the coevolution of adaptations for
chance transport as a place where adaptation and chance play a
peculiar and interesting role for Darwin. As far as I know, the
question of chance transport has yet to receive any extensive dis-
cussion in the literature, and this section is bothwelcome and novel.
Further, Johnson both closely tracks and evaluates hypotheses
concerning the development of Darwin’s thought over time. He is a
keen reader of the changes that occurred from Darwin’s journey
aboard the H.M.S. Beagle, through his various private trans-
mutation notebooks, the various editions of the Origin of species,
and his later works including the Descent of man and Variations of
plants and animals under domestication. Some of the material
Johnson covers, such as Darwin’s “Old and Useless Notes,” are not
often discussed in connection with Darwin’s views on chance, and
these broader connections are incredibly instructive.
In this sense, then, I wish to express wholehearted agreement
with one of Johnson’s central theses: that the exploration of Dar-
win’s various uses of “chance” ought to be one of the central foci in
attempting to understand Darwin’s thought. Doing so can bring
together parts of Darwin’s oeuvre not normally united in Darwin
studies. For example, close attention to the use of chance serves as a
fruitful way for Johnson to explore whether or not Darwin did, as
has occasionally been alleged, become “more Lamarckian” over the
course of his writings, offering greater pride of place to use and
disuse. Examining howchance is invoked in Darwin’s discussions of
giraffes added to the sixth edition of the Origin (in response,
Johnson persuasively argues, to St. George Jackson Mivart’s
extremely negative review of the Origin) lets us see that, in fact,
Darwin’s attitude toward the role and prevalence of the inheritance
of characteristics via use and disuse remains roughly constant
throughout Darwin’s works. Johnson has therefore set for himself
an incredibly difﬁcult task, one never to have been attempted in
this form. The work is worthy of admiration for this reason alone.
3. Chance and chances in Darwin
We meet with problems, however, when we turn to Johnson’s
central, and most controversial, thesis. Johnson argues that Dar-
win’s works, properly understood, will show that, while he
believed as early as 1837 that “chance” was “a basic factor in evo-
lution,” he consciously worked “to cast the role of chance in ways
that, while preserving its central meaning, would either obscure its
role in the theory or at least make it seem innocuous to otherwise
friendly natural philosophers” (p. xiii).1 According to Johnson,
borrowing the coinage of Dennett (1995), Darwin saw chance as a
“dangerous idea,” one that he would have to actively suppress
within his writings in order to be accepted by the professional,
theistic, British scientiﬁc establishment.
To begin to evaluate this claim, I want to focus on a particularly
troublesome phrase in the quote above. Johnson argues that Darwin
wanted to preserve the central meaning of chance in hisworks, despite
surface-level alterations to the phrasing of his arguments. For the
reasons already mentioned, however, I ﬁnd it doubtful that, for Dar-
win, chance has a central meaning to be preserved in the ﬁrst place.
In one sense, Johnson acknowledges this fact. Across his book,
he details instances in which Darwin uses chance in a myriad
different ways. Chance refers to something like “probability of
survival” in the struggle for existence, as well as the “fortuity” that
new variations will match environmental conditions and outcom-
pete their rivals (p. xxi; this distinction is then collapsed on p. 11).
We also have chance as unknowability (pp. xxiv, 111) both in
practice (pp. 16, 105) and in principle (pp. xxiii, 17, 104, 113, 124,
191),2 as phenomena which it is impossible to explain or under-
stand (pp.17, 124), as isotropy or randomness with respect to future
adaptive needs (pp. xxiii, 13, 103, 112, 116), as absence of creative or
designing power (pp. 37, 77), as causes of which we are currently
ignorant (pp.13, 76, 125) or laws of which we are currently ignorant
(pp. 39, 137), as events which cannot be predicted (pp. 16, 111), or
even as a cause in its own right (pp. 72, 171, 209).3 Unfortunately,
these differing notions of chance are not clearly distinguished
throughout the work, making the interpretation of some of John-
son’s central claims exceptionally difﬁcult.4
1 Page numbers without reference refer to Johnson.
2 Notably, Johnson doesn’t believe the distinction between predictability in
practice and predictability in principle to be relevant to his project here, because “as
I see it, both classes are ‘chance’ variations for Darwin” (p. 68, note 10). This is odd,
as he will go on to discuss this distinction, though only brieﬂy, at pp. 175e181, and it
is clear that it has bearing on his later discussions of the relationship between
chance and predictability or understanding. Unfortunately, a discussion of the
impact of the indeﬁnite/deﬁnite variation distinction on Johnson’s arguments
would require another essay of nearly this length.
3 This last notion, to the extent that it appears in Johnson’s work (e.g., that
Darwin’s uses of the terms accident and happenstance “suggest ‘chance’ as the
‘cause’ of variation” (p. 172)) must be accidental, as Johnson elsewhere (e.g., p. 137)
acknowledges that Darwin clearly believed that every event in the universe had a
deterministic, law-like cause (deriving from his commitment to Herschel’s philos-
ophy of science; see Hodge, 1992, 1989, 1983). As Manier accurately put the matter,
Darwin “attributed no causal force to chance itself” (Manier, 1978, p. 121).
4 In the span of one paragraph, for example, Johnson writes that chance “meant
‘no assignable reason’” (perhaps unpredictability or unknowability in principle),
that it also meant “cause unknown” (unknowability in practice, at least, if not in
principle), as well as that the causes “ultimately may be resolved into deterministic
laws” (ignorance of laws), and ﬁnally that those laws “are often beyond human
comprehension” (unknowability in principle) and “cannot plausibly be assumed to
be directed by divine intelligence” (lack of design; all p. 191).
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A few of Johnson’s arguments, on the other hand, are under-
mined by the lack of a handful of concepts of chance that other
authors have taken to be important to Darwin. As an example,
Darwin clearly recognized something not unlike the “law of large
numbers”di.e., that over a large number of trials, actual fre-
quencies will converge with expected frequencies. Johnson quotes
Darwin to this effect in Notebook B, arguing with respect to a point
about the distribution of birds that “Law of chance would cause this
to have happened in all, but less in water birds” (Darwin, 1837, p.
B55e). Johnson, though, goes on to write:
A “law of chance”? That is a curious expression, because “law”
and “chance” would seem to be opposed to one another. Darwin
would soon come to recognize the incompatibility, but hewould
never e even in later life e come to resolve the inconsistency, at
least in public expression, in favor of one or the other. (p. 90)
But nothing about this quote is particularly strange, nor does it
reﬂect any deep incompatibility in Darwin’s thought, if he has in
mind something like the law of large numbers.
4. Arguments from chance
My primary worry with Johnson’s book, then, derives from the
combination of the trouble expressed abovedthat is, that there is
no univocal category of “chance” for Darwindwith portions of
Johnson’s central argumentative thesis, which concern how Dar-
win’s views about “chance” may or may not have changed over
time.
When Johnson writes, then, that it is one of his central claims
that ‘chance’ (in its primary meaning for Darwin) would be regar-
ded as a ‘dangerous’ idea” (p. xiii), I doubt that we can evaluate
whether this claim is true or false. Certainly, some things that
Darwin meant by “chance” could have been, and were, regarded as
dangerousdmost prominent among them that particular features
of species, including and most especially the intellect and moral
faculties of humans, were not specially designed by a Creator. But
many other things that Darwin certainly meant by “chance” were
not so regarded.
To take one example, consider Johnson’s claim that Darwin
believed that the laws underlying “chance” phenomena were not
designed by God and utilized as secondary causes. The argument
goes something like this. It certainly is conceptually possible that
“these laws might themselves have been designed to produce
‘guided,’ even ‘foreseen’ results. Plan, purpose, and design could be
comfortably accommodated within a worldview that attributed
natural productions to the operation of natural laws” (p. 76). This
view was widely accepted by Darwin’s contemporaries with
respect to, for example, the laws of physics, but it was not, Johnson
says, open to Darwin’s laws of biology. Why not? First, the creative
power itself would be “checked” by the operation of these laws,
which Johnson describes as “a terrible blow to the creative power”
(p. 77), despite this idea’s long Newtonian heritage. Second, Darwin
argues extensively against special creation in Lyell’s sensedthe
notion that species were the products of individual divine creative
acts (e.g., at Darwin, 1838a, p. E59). Together, Johnson argues that
these positions entail that “Darwin had doubts that the natural laws
were divinely created” (p. 78). Johnson takes the issue to be settled
by a letter Darwinwrites to FrancesWedgwood (“as revealing of his
private views as any other letter I have seen”), in which Darwin
claims that the combination of apparent evidence in favor of design
(the overall harmony and order of the universe) and apparent
evidence against design (the often haphazard structure of organ-
isms) results in his being entirely perplexed about the question
(quoted p. 81).
By just a few pages later, however, this ambiguity and perplexity
disappears, with Johnson claiming that “[a] great deal of evidence
from Darwin’s private writings suggests that he regarded a role for
Intelligence in the crafting of the laws of evolution to be as fanciful
as the idea that Intelligence directly supervenes in the creation of
species or the struggle of organisms in everyday life” (p. 84). I
cannot discern on what evidential basis this claim is to be sup-
ported, particularly in light of Darwin’s extensive writings reﬂect-
ing both his confusion concerning matters theological and his
frequent (if qualiﬁed) support of the divine origin of the laws un-
derlying creation. To take just one example, consider the following
passage from the D notebook:
What a magniﬁcent view one can take of the world Astronom-
ical & unknown causes modiﬁed by unknown ones, cause
changes in geography & changes of climate suspended to change
of climate from physical causes, e then suspended changes of
form in the organic world, as adaptation, & these changing affect
each other, & their bodies by certain laws of harmony keep
perfect in these themselves. [.] How far grander than idea from
cramped imagination that God created (warring against those
very laws he established in all organic nature) the Rhinoceros of
Java & Sumatra, that since the time of the Silurian he has made a
long succession of vile molluscous animals. How beneath the
dignity of him, who [interlined: is supposed to have] said let
there be light & there was light. [interlined: bad taste: whom it
has been declared “he said let there be light & there was light”]
(Darwin, 1838b, pp. D36e7)
Putting aside Darwin’s Unitarian doubt in the literal truth of the
Genesis creation story (a doubt which he shared with many of his
scientiﬁc contemporaries), on the basis of such evidence I would
rather take Darwin at his word. Faced with a tally of accounts for
and against design, he simply honestly reported his inability to
come to any clear conclusion on the matter.
But it is here that we run into our recurring trouble with
differing meanings of “chance.” For it is certain that it would have
been a highly “dangerous idea” for Darwin to suppose that God had
absolutely no role even in the production of the deterministic laws
underlying the phenomena that hewould refer to, in our ignorance,
as “chancy.” Much different, on the other hand, is the status of his
rejection of special creation. A long tradition in biologydincluding,
perhaps most notably, Cuvier (Rudwick, 1997, p. 83)dhad argued
that withholding of judgment on the question of special creation
was warranted, and even Lyell himself, while he did not remark in
public on the processes that would create new species, argued in
his private correspondence that (with the exception of man) this
was likely to have been a naturalistic process (Rudwick, 1998, p. 8).
The rejection of special creation, then, is not a very “dangerous”
position.5 The ﬁne details of just what Darwin means by invoking
“chance,” thendthat is, whether this “chance” refers to the pres-
ence of unknown deterministic laws, or to the lack of overarching
design, or to a process working randomly with respect to future
adaptive needs, or what have youdare exceptionally important to
the argument here, and are unfortunately absent.
Another problematic line of argument in Johnson’s work con-
cerns Darwin’s own epistemic attitude toward his invocations of
chance in the generation of variations. At the very opening of the
book, Johnson claims that “Darwin did not expect ever to be able to
5 The parallel here between Johnson’s claim that Darwin “was deterred from
spelling out his deepest convictions in public writings” (p. 85) and Lyell’s reticence
to do the same is also quite interesting, though I lack space to comment upon it
here.
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provide the needed explanation for variations” (p. 3) e that is, the
laws that would render them explicable in terms of their under-
lying deterministic laws.
The problemwith this claim is that Darwin spent the better part
of his career attempting to do precisely this. His theory of
pangenesis was intended to explicate the very laws that would
govern the reproduction and modiﬁcation of traits over time, ac-
counting for both resemblance to and difference from parents, as
well as inheritance of acquired characters. Pangenesis receives a
mere two pages at the end of a chapter on Darwin’s treatment of
giraffes and relationship to Lamarckianism. Importantly, despite
the fact that pangenesis was only published with the Variation near
the end of Darwin’s career, Hodge has persuasively argued that the
study of variation was a lifelong pursuit for Darwin, brought on in
particular by Darwin’s workwith his mentor Robert Edmond Grant.
He writes, in a chapter titled “Darwin as a lifelong generation
theorist”:
There can be no doubting that a major preoccupation of Dar-
win’s from 1837 to his ﬁnal years was in extending analogical
inferences, from the comparison of sexual and asexual modes of
generation in individual organisms, to entities above and below
them in the organizational hierarchy, all the way down to living
“atoms” and all the way up the “tree of life.” (Hodge, 1985, pp.
237e238)
Theories of generation, that is, can be found from as early as
Darwin’s B notebook up until his ﬁnal writings. Darwin simply
cannot, therefore, mean that the causes of variation are unknow-
able in principle, or that chance variation lies forever beyond our
understanding. Many of them were certainly unknowable in prac-
tice, at the timedbut this, again, is far from being a “dangerous
idea.” It is, rather, the ignorance which drives the scientiﬁc process.
5. Too many chances
To sum up, then, Johnson’s book is difﬁcult to evaluate. On the
one hand, it offers a penetrating and insightful reading of an
incredibly broad array of Darwin’s works, as well as many of the
works involved in his reception in England. Johnson locates the full
breadth of Darwin’s invocation of chance, pointing out adeptly and
quite correctly that Darwin struggled with how to frame this
concept over time and across areas of research, a struggle reﬂected
both privately in the notebooks and correspondence and publicly in
the published works. On the other hand, this reading is offered as
evidence for a set of theses about the role of a univocal concept of
“chance” in Darwin’s thought that is itself doubtful, and the argu-
ment for these theses seems tenuous on multiple counts.
I do think, however, that Johnson’s book can serve as an
important spur to the community of historians and philosophers of
biology working on Darwin. For I think the inescapable conclusion
upon reading Johnson’s work, one for which Johnson extensively
and entirely successfully argues, is that the plurality of meanings
standing behind “chance” as Darwin uses it, as well as when it is
used as a cudgel against him by his critics, is much more signiﬁcant
an issue than has commonly been appreciated, and one that de-
serves more sustained and detailed attention. While Johnson’s
work, therefore, is not the last word on the subject, it will be a
signiﬁcant contribution to our understanding of Darwin if it can
serve as the ﬁrst word in, following Johnson’s example, a more
thorough exploration of Darwin’s use of chance and its role in his
reception.
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